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THE IMPACT O F SOCIETAL CHANGE ON THE US ARMY
by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM L. HAUSER, USA

THE SITUATION IN WHICH
WE FIND OURSELVES

(What is the impact on the Army,
especially in regard to its manpower
policy, of current trends in American
Society? What are the near term strategic
implications of this impact? How can the
Army best retain mission readiness in
such a situation?)

In the first place, the United States has not
"won" in Vietnam in any way remotely
resembling the victories of World Wars I and
II , or even of Korea. As our forces withdraw,
the war in Vietnam continues. Even if the
eventual result is an independent and
non- Communist S o u t h Vietnam, the
perception of the American people will
probably be that the war's outcome little
merited its sacrifices. We are not, therefore,
entering a typical postwar period.
Secondly, in the allocation of national
resources, emphasis has shifted from foreign
policy matters to domestic problems. The
plight of the central cities, inter-racial
v i o l e n c e , y o u t h f u l dissent against
governmental and business "establishments,"
environmental pollution, expanded welfare
demands by disadvantaged groups, burgeoning
educational and transportation
requirements-all these forces in our society
clamor for political attention and tax dollars.
At the same time, there is growing popular
belief that the Cold War is a phenomenon of
the past, that the world has entered a period
of relative international stability-regardless
of the fact that the power of potential
adversaries is on the rise. To be sure, tensions
are high and blood is being shed at various
points on the globe, but American vital
interests d o not appear to be immediately
threatened and American troops are not
d i r e c t l y involved. This broadly held
perception of America's position in the world
is, in a modern sense, a new phenomenon.
Never since the 1930's have the American
p e o p l e , rightly or wrongly, held so
domestically-oriented a system of priorities.1
Third, there is a social revolution going on
in America. It has been described by a
number of astute observers in various terms,2

There is a tendency on the part of many
professional soldiers to believe that the status
of the Army has "bottomed out" and is on its
way up again. The basis for this optimism is
an assumption that loss of status has been
caused by public association of the military
profession with the politics of the Vietnam
War, and an inevitable but short-lived
tendency of the American people t o become
anti-military in postwar periods. When the
war is finally over, and the armed services
have had a chance to catch their breath and
get back to fundamentals, the crisis will
presumably pass.
This sort of optimism, unless combined
with continuous realistic appraisal and
vigorous action, could be the ruin of the
United States Army. We must adjust our
thinking radically if we are to fulfill our
mission of national defense.
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does demand a recognition that what the
Army is experiencing today is not just
another temporary postwar dip in public
attitudes. We may indeed have hit bottom,
but we are not yet on our way up. Lean years
lie ahead.

but always with the conviction that it is a new
experience for American society. It is more
fundamental than the mere manifestations of
r a c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , ecological, a n d
socio-economic protest-it is a challenge to
the concept of authority itself. The impact
upon the traditionally hierarchical and
authoritarian armed services, the lifeblood of
which is young manpower, promises t o be
enormous.
Finally, there is a disturbing trend in public
attitudes which has little or nothing to do
with anti-military feeling. There was a time,
not so long ago, when the armed services were
regarded by the older generation-the parents
and teachers of the young-as a wholesome, if
in some respects disagreeable, way of life for
their sons and students. This is largely no
longer the case. Public airing of our problems
has painted a lurid picture of racial violence,
drug abuse, and unethical behavior in the
armed services, especially in the Army.3
Whether the image is true or false is not the
point. It is the perception which influences
the counsel given to the young by their elders.
If the perception is unfavorable, as may well
be the case, the counsel is likely to be
negative.
The impact of this shift in attitudes is
compounded by steeply rising costs of both
military equipment and manpower. The
former is a result of inflation and the
i n c r e a s i n g technological complexity of
warfare; the latter a consequence both of
rising wage levels in modern society and of
the need to attract men to a military life in
the face of countervailing public attitudes.
There is no indication, however, that military
budgets will be increased significantly in the
near future, especially in expenditures for
general purpose forces. One may speculate
that this is a reflection of popular distaste for
the sorts of forces which, once employed,
involve the United States in a manner which
makes extrication difficult. But whatever the
cause, we may reasonably expect an
approximately "steady-state" Army budget
for some years. The same amount of money,
unfortunately, will probably buy less and less
over that span of time.
This situation does not call for panic, but it

THE IMPACT ON THE ARMY

The most far-reaching result of this
situation will be the end of the draft, an
occurrence which bids fair to change the
whole military "life style." The first and most
obvious effect will be that the armed services
will have to relax nonessential disciplinary
practices and provide more amenities in order
to attract young men from an increasingly
liberalized society. This has already begun, in
anticipation of an end to conscription. And
there is already a predictable reaction t o this
loosening process, even with the crunch-the
end of the draft-more than a year away. The
armed services will have to determine, by
high-level decision in order to take the
pressure off commanders, the necessary
balance between liberalization for the sake of
recruiting and authoritarianism for the sake of
combat effectiveness. There is no point in
arguing which way the Army ought t o go, for
com p romise is inevitable. Americans are no
more likely to stand for an Army which
cannot fight than for a highly disciplined
organization with empty ranks.
A second major effect of an end t o the
draft may be a need for a disproportionate
expansion of training facilities. At first blush,
the reverse might appear t o be the case. If the
Army became attractive enough t o fill its
ranks with volunteers, it is reasoned, it would
surely be able to achieve a rate of about 20
percent first-term and 85 percent career
reenlistments, not significantly higher than
present rates for volunteers. This would mean,
in turn, a decreasing need for original
enlistments.4
But even assuming that the Army can get
the enlistment rates it needs, it is probable
that educational levels will decline. Most
economists foresee the 1970's as a period of
m a j o r e c o n o m i c expansion; however
attractive the Army may become, it is not
10
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likely to be the career of choice for very
many well-educated young men, given other
opportunities and the probable climate of
public opinion. At the same time, political
commitments to hold down unemployment
and public desire for the Army to provide
"relevant" service to society will probably
require continued acceptance of a number of
poorly educated (but educable) men. As a
result, Army basic training may well have to
be broadened to include remedial education
for many of its trainees, and MOS schools will
have t o provide their students with
mathematical and mechanical fundamentals
which are today largely taken for granted.
T h e m a n p o w e r impact will thus be
twofold-more training time and more
trainers.5
A third impact of an end to the draft,
w h i c h will affect both lifestyle and
manpower, will be a higher standard of living
for the soldier. Large amounts will have t o be
spent-are already beginning to be spent-on
improving enlisted men's quarters, training,
and recreation. It is unrealistic to believe that
men will be attracted by higher pay alone, in
a prosperous and somewhat anti-military
society. More cash in the pocket is no remedy
for the disincentives of living in open-bay
wooden barracks and spending the day in
boring lectures or in raking leaves. But
r e p l a c e m e n t o f existing billets with
dormitory-style quarters will be an expensive
proposition, meaningful training is costly, and
e x p a n d e d r e c r e a t i o n a l facilities and
civilianized installation maintenance will
r e q u i r e large funding increases. Such
expenditures, moreover, do not fall into the
category of "nice-to-have," nor do they
"coddle" the troops. Vigorous and realistic
training is an indispensable prerequisite to
good discipline and to mission readiness; a
decent life on post is the only alternative to
an increased degree of soldier misbehavior and
dissipation (especially with higher pay) in the
honky-tonks and "crash pads" of neighboring
towns. It is hardly far-fetched to visualize an
annual expenditure for operations and
maintenance double the current figure of
around $2000 per man.
A fourth impact will probably be a
12

requirement for improved systems of
personnel administration and military justice.
Part of the cause could be a somewhat higher
incidence of misfits and troublemakers among
those whom the Army is able to attract.
Whatever the character of young men
recruited into the Army, however, the fact
remains that today's youth increasingly
d e m a n d s individual treatment by the
organization. This will probably require more
military lawyers, judges, and professional
administrators and counsellors; and these
specialists, as is the case currently with
doctors, may have to be offered higher
monetary incentives in the absence of a draft.
As mentioned earlier, the cost of military
materiel is also rising sharply. There is
probably no turning the clock back on this
trend; our potential enemies are advancing
rapidly and our forces must try to stay not
just abreast but ahead, especially if we must
compensate for lower manpower levels.
The manpower we are able t o attract will at
some point match what we can afford. If one
considers all of these factors together-higher
pay, higher materiel costs, higher operating
and maintenance costs in both dollars and
manpower, but steady-state budgets and
greater difficulty in recruiting-it can be
assumed that the Army may become
significantly smaller than it has been a t any
time in recent memory.
Two questions come to mind as one views
such a prospect. First, would a smaller Army,
having lost the economies of scale of a larger
organization and having acquired the heavier
n o n - t a c t i c a l m a n p o w e r requirements
discussed earlier, have anything left with
which t o fight? Second, to what degree can
such a reduced force rely on the mobilization
of reserves to augment itself in time of crisis?
These questions will be discussed in the next
section.
STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES

Before we can address whether the Army
will be able to fight, we must examine the
likely pattern of conflict in the foreseeable
future. T o begin with, it is generally
acknowledged that large-scale, sustained,

conventional warfare is an extremely unlikely
option for American forces. The most likely
theater in which such a scenario can be
visualized is Western Europe, and there are
some who believe that conventional conflict
there would almost surely escalate into
tactical nuclear warfare, and thence possibly
into a strategic nuclear exchange. This may in
fact be considered the central assumption of
the American deterrent in Europe. Even if
NATO general purpose forces were not able
t o stop a determined Warsaw Pact onslaught,
American forces are strong enough, in
conjunction with allied forces, that their
destruction would be a time-consuming and
bloody process. The size of the American
contingent is such that its loss, especially if
delayed long enough to become highly visible
i n the American consciousness, would
probably precipitate general war.
If the European scenario is an unlikely one,
the deterrence which makes it so still requires
sizable ground forces. Just how large these
f o r c e s n e e d b e t o constitute such
"conventional deterrence" is undetermined.
Assuming, however, that a major drawdown
in the near future would be viewed as
politically destabilizing, and assuming further
that the force must be tactically and
logistically self-sufficient until reinforced, it is
hard to conceive of a force significantly
smaller than that presently deployed.
This European force requirement can be
considered to pose three concomitants. First,
it must be fully manned and equipped, for its
deterrent value lies in its potential to defend.
Second, it must be reinforceable in the event
of conflict, so that the deterrent is confirmed
by Soviet knowledge that a quick victory
could not be won. It is faintly conceivable
that, without the capability t o reinforce,
American attitudes might accept the defeat of
our Europe-deployed force if the only
alternative appeared to be nuclear holocaust.
But if reinforcements were available, it is
unimaginable that our troops in Europe
would not be augmented and the United
States thereby inextricably committed. So we
may further assume a requirement for a
s e c o n d balanced force, based in the
continental United States but earmarked for
Europe.

Third, neither a European force n
earmarked reinforcement can be cons
deployable to another part of the world. This
brings us to consideration of the kind of
ground conflict, other than in Europe, in
which the Army might find itself involved. It
is almost inconceivable that conventional
forces will soon again be deployed in a
counterinsurgency. Whether properly so or
n o t , t h e Vietnam experience has so
conditioned American attitudes that only an
overt attack, across a clearly defined border
and against a country whose survival is
commonly deemed to be in our vital national
interest, would surely commit US forces in
the near future. But if history teaches us
anything, it is t o expect the unexpected. If
such a situation as that described did arise, or
if an insurgency was publicly recognized as
the equivalent of overt attack, it would
p r o b a b l y be accompanied by general
international tension of such a nature as to
preclude diversion of Europe-committed
forces. S o a third balanced conventional force
would be highly desirable.
The purpose of this brief analysis has been
to illustrate the rationale for an Army with a
balanced force structure not significantly
smaller than at present. This would appear to
be a modest proposal, until one considers that
the active force structure designed for the
requirements just discussed must be a
balanced one, to include matching support
increments.
It may be argued that it is not necessary to
have immediately deployable support units,
that mobilization of reserves will serve the
purpose. In the case of general war, this
assumption might be valid. The Vietnam
experience has surely taught us, however, that
we should not assume public acceptance of
mobilization for anything short of general
war. This is likely to be all the more true in an
all-volunteer environment, wherein the public
may look to the standing army to play the
role for which it has been "hired." Even if
this changes someday, as the dust settles from
Vietnam and the American people achieve a
new level of political sophistication, there is
some doubt that reserve units can be
maintained in anything like their current
numbers and manning levels in the absence of
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about modifying Army organization and
practices in order to maintain a combat-ready
force.
It will be argued that this whole problem
statement rests on an assumption of
diminished public support. That is so. The
chances are excellent that the draft will expire
in 1973. The Army's budget will probably
stay at around its present level for the next
five years or so. The public, especially the
young, will probably stay soured on the Army
for some years. And the American people will
continue to demand that the Army provide a
high degree of national security with the
resources allocated.

a draft. For the near future, in any case, the
Regular Army will probably have to fight
with the forces on hand at the beginning of a
war.
I t is a subject of some debate whether or
not the United States is entering an era of
"neo-isolationism." Current trends and
announced policies certainly indicate some
degree of retrenchment. We are withdrawing
from Vietnam, we have reduced our forces in
Korea, and we shall surely phase down
military activities all around the Asian
rimland as the support needs of conflict
diminish. Even in Europe, as alluded to
earlier, we may reduce forces marginally. But
to assume that the United States, with its vast
worldwide diplomatic and economic interests,
and with its principal adversary rapidly
developing truly global power, can retreat
into "Fortress America" is nonsense. And
although present trends indicate greater
reliance on sea and air power, involvement in
international affairs will continue to require
land forces and the ability to use them, if
necessary, in the national interest.
The real danger is that we shall so weaken
the readiness of our ground forces that, in the
event o f a sudden crisis but one not
apparently serious enough to mobilize
reserves, active forces will have to be withheld
or withdrawn from an expanding conflict.
This sort of situation really could create
neo-isolationism, if the general public came to
believe-rightly or wrongly-that America had
ceased to be a world power, and should
therefore reduce risk and save resources by
dismantling its general purpose forces. Thus
an occurrence which had the immediate effect
of embarrassment for the Army might have a
longer-term impact on the entire national
strategy. In short, we may stumble into a
neo-isolationism that we never planned.
What is vitally needed, then, is the ability
to respond to crisis situations which lie
somewhere between general war and the case
of the Marines evacuating American nationals
from revolutionary strife. The question boils
down to one of—how d o we meet these force
requirements with severely constrained
manpower resources? The subject of the next
section of this paper will be how we might go

WHAT WE

MUST DO

We must quit hoping for some miracle to
rescue us from this situation. The Russians are
not likely to help us out of our internal
difficulties by misbehaving internationally.
The inclination of the Western world is for
detente, and the Soviets appear either t o share
that mood or to be eager to exploit it for the
time being. And there is no use to hope for a
significant change of heart by the American
people, for the reasons discussed earlier. It is
sometimes said that the public "has to
support the Army." But we should well know
that the public doesn't "have to" do anything
at all. I t is we, the Army, who must-within
allocated resources-provide for the security
of the American people and our democratic
institutions.
We must keep centrally in mind that what
we are trying to maintain is the capability to
project ground combat power internationally.
Given the present mood of the country,
however, striving for such a capability may
easily be misinterpreted as an intention t o use
it. The principle that the military does not
make national policy-of which professional
s o l d i e r s a r e aware- is not generally
appreciated by the public. Even in highly
sophisticated circles, there is a widely-held
belief that military institutions tend to push
their own employment with optimistic
promises, and that political leaders are more
tempted t o "foreign adventure" if they have
the means at hand. S o it is important that any
14

have acquired some habits wh'
come to take for granted. For
still have essentially the sa
division with which we fought World War
Surely that is not the best organization for
c o n c e i v a b l e tactical scenarios-including
counterinsurgency. One would think that
aerial resupply, advanced communications,
and automatic data processing would have
permitted an increased span of control, fewer
headquarters, and greater decentralization.
The contrary appears to have been the case in
Vietnam, as any comparison of size and
number of headquarters staffs will reveal. We
need to question seriously whether brigade
commanders should be able to monitor in
detail the progress of platoons, and division
commanders the progress of companies.
Next, we must be willing to impose a major
degree of austerity upon the way we do
business. Exhortation would be useless for
this purpose, for austerity is such a relative
matter. So, distasteful as it may seem,
Headquarters Department of the Army will
probably need to prescribe the upper limits
of: the manner in which field and garrison
headquarters are furnished and decorated; the
elaborateness of briefings; the extent of
public relations activities; the creature
comforts of officials and visitors; and the
numbers of aides, special assistants, orderlies,
personal clerks, and the like. We should
probably also question whether we can
afford, in the lean years, current levels of
military manpower support of open messes,
post exchanges, commissaries, and other such
activities on well-groomed posts. Or perhaps
we should question the very nature of the
Army post itself-might it not be vastly more
economical to maintain such installations
only for combat troops, with on-post housing
and facilities as necessary for troop morale
and t o compensate for remoteness, and move
non-tactical activities into urban warehouses
and office buildings? Domestic political
considerations, the rationale for which may
be just as valid as exclusively military factors,
will of course constrain the Army's ability to
execute such measures.
Those are some of the areas in which we
should seek economies in order to maintain

reorganization of the Army not be advertised
in terms of seeking international capability,
b u t a s i n s u r a n c e against unforeseen
contingencies in a dangerous and unruly
world.
The purpose of this paper is not to argue
for specific reforms or even for certain types
of reform. It is rather to urge that we
acknowledge the seriousness of the situation
facing us, and resolve to examine our own
organization in an analytical and unemotional
manner, to determine how we may maintain
true combat capability. Any procedure or
organization which does not contribute
directly or nearly directly to combat power
should be a candidate for economy.
The first area to explore is non-tactical
organization, starting with those elements
farthest from the rifleman on the ground. The
Army cannot unilaterally reduce the size of
OSD and the Joint Staff, but we can certainly
take another hard look at our own Secretariat
and General Staff, including Class I I agencies.
So many studies on where and how t o reduce
have already been done that there is probably
little benefit to be gained by more studying.
Instead, we should assume that the relative
sizes of present suborganizations fairly
represent their current relative importance,
and consider an across-the-board cut for all.
Such a cut should probably be assigned by
grade, lest the result be an organization of all
chiefs and no braves. The same searching look
should be taken at CONARC, USAREUR,
USARPAC, AMC, CDC, etc., and the same
sort of arbitrary cut by grade considered. The
overall reduction would have to be assigned a
target date a few years hence, t o avoid
excessive hardship on individuals and to give
commanders and agency heads a chance to
restructure their organizations for maximum
effectiveness with reduced numbers. This
would also permit a change of commanders
and agency heads before the target date,
avoiding the tendency of some incumbents to
feel that reduction of their organizations
reflects personally on themselves.
The process should be repeated for
higher-level tactical organizations, but with a
scalpel rather than a meat ax. An element of
ruthlessness will be required, however, for we
15

in spite of our individual interests, to take a
hard look at the grade structure of the Army.
This is the most painful subject of all, but one
without which the economies examined
earlier will be impossible. The recent flurry of
Congressional criticism on this subject should
not put us on the defensive, for it is natural
and understandable that we have not observed
a gradual process which has been going on in
our Army ever since World War I I.6 In the
name of rewarding our loyal members with
higher pay and privileges, we may have
created an imbalance of doers and supervisors.
It will be very hard to convince political
leaders and the public of our concern about
national security if we cannot demonstrate
that concern by a visible sacrifice of our own
institutional interests.
We are at the beginning of at least a decade
of public indifference to military concerns.
This will have a significant impact, as yet
incalculable but certainly large, upon the
quantity and quality of monetary and
manpower resources available to the Army.
At the same time, however, the requirement
for combat-ready ground forces shows n o
signs of diminishing, and may even increase.
The result may well be a serious shortfall
between requirements and resources, which
will necessitate major internal economies to
resolve. Let us accept the probability of this
situation, and make whatever sacrifices are
necessary to meet the needs of national
security. That's our job.

combat capability within allocated resources.
The other side of the coin will be to convince
a skeptical public that the country needs the
capability which we have maintained.
Otherwise we shall have our forces further
reduced and our savings allocated elsewhere.
As we are well aware from the NATO
experience, when a deterrent has succeeded
there is a tendency to want to dismantle
fighting forces on the grounds that the war
never happened.
We must be willing to overcome, at least
e n o u g h for unemotional analysis, our
reluctance to seek so-called "relevant" tasks.
Of course we do not want to play the tramp
asking for work at the kitchen door. But there
are tasks which the Army can undertake, as
an Army and without losing unit integrity,
which will benefit the national economy,
decrease social unrest, "sell" the utility of the
Army, and simultaneously improve unit
cohesiveness a n d , indirectly, combat
effectiveness.
Four criteria should govern the sorts of
tasks we should seek and accept. First, the
task should be an activity for which the Army
is suited. Second, it should not destroy unit
integrity, and should (ideally) be performable
on the military installation. Third, it should
not be incompatible with the unit's readiness
mission. Finally, it should be of such a nature
that the unit can be deployed on a training or
operational mission, without either undoing
benefits or crippling combat effectiveness. Ad
hoc disaster relief is an obvious choice,
v a r i o u s p r o g r a m s o f w o r k i n g with
disadvantaged youth might well repay the
effort with enhanced recruiting, and certain
ecological activities might combine the
benefits of outdoor living and vigorous
physical exercise.
T h e foregoing categories of
reform-reduction of non-tactical overhead,
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f t a c t i c a l control,
imposition of austerity in work style,
de-militarization of "fringe benefit" activities,
and acceptance of appropriate domestic
action tasks-all have one feature in common.
All emphasize the working level of the Army
over the supervisory level. So we must be
willing, for the sake of national security and
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